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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey focuses on the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court
which will be of interest to Florida real property lawyers and real es-
tate professionals. Included are three cases from other courts which the
author thinks are worthy of attention. The time frame covered by this
survey is October 1, 1990 to August 1, 1991.
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center.
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II. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
A. Real Estate Sales Contracts-Liquidated Damages
Lefemine v. Baron.1 Justice Grimes wrote the opinion in which
Justices Overton, Ehrlich, Barkett, Kogan and Chief Justice Shaw con-
curred. Justice McDonald dissented without opinion.
The buyers2 signed a contract to buy a residence. When they were
unable to obtain financing for the purchase, they sued for the return of
their ten percent deposit. The sellers3 counterclaimed, asserting that
the deposit represented liquidated damages.4 The sellers prevailed in
the circuit court and that decision was affirmed by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal5 in a decision which was in direct conflict with an
earlier decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, Cortes v. Adair.6
The question before the supreme court was whether the deposit
forfeiture clause was valid. Liquidated damages clauses are valid in
Florida if they meet the two part test established in Hyman v. Cohen.,
The test requires that,
1. the damages must not be readily ascertainable at the time of the
drawing of the contract; and
2. the amount must not be so grossly disproportionate to any rea-
sonably expected damages as to indicate that it was chosen to in-
duce performance rather than to liquidate damages.
The first part of the test was not an issue in this case.
An amount chosen for the purpose of preventing a party from
breaching would, by definition, be a penalty.8 Thus the second part of
the test is a method of determining if the parties actually intended to
create a penalty clause, regardless of what it is labeled, rather than a
liquidated damages clause. If intended as a penalty, the clause would
1. 573 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1991).
2. Daniel and Catherine Lefemine were the buyers.
3. Judith W, Baron was the seller.
4. The real estate broker, S & N Kurash, Inc., cross-claimed against the seller
for one-half of whatever the seller might recover. The broker's right to recover was not
discussed by the supreme court.
5. 556 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
6. 494 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
7. 73 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
8. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-31
(3d ed. 1987).
[Vol. 16
Brown
not be enforceable. This case illustrates that part two of the test is not
the only way to determine whether the parties had an impermissible
intent.
The amount involved here would not, per se, have made this clause
fail the test. In dicta, the supreme court agreed with the district and
circuit courts that the loss of ten percent of the purchase price9 was
neither unconscionable nor so grossly disproportionate to the amount of
damages which might reasonably flow from a breach of the sales con-
tract as to show it was intended only to induce full performance. How-
ever, there was another factor to consider in this case. The contract
provided that upon default,
the deposit(s) ...may be retained or recovered by or for the ac-
count of Seller as liquidated damages . . . and in full settlement of
any claims; whereupon all parties shall be relieved of all obligations
under the Contract; or Seller, at his option, may proceed at law or
in equity to enforce his rights under the contract.10
Florida courts had previously invalidated lease provisions which gave
lessors similar options to keep security deposits or seek actual dam-
ages.11 Those precedents had first been applied to a real estate sales
contract by the third district in the case providing the conflict here,
Cortes v. Adair.12
The supreme court interpreted those precedents "to mean that the
existence of the option reflects that the parties did not have the mutual
intention to stipulate to a fixed amount as their liquidated damages in
the event of breach."13 In a true liquidated damages situation, the
buyer takes the risk that the seller's provable actual damages might be
lower than the liquidated amount, and the seller takes the risk that his
provable actual damages might be higher than the liquidated amount.
However, the addition of the option here changed the very nature of
9. In this case the deposit was $38,500. 573 So. 2d at 327.
10. Id. at 327-28.
11. Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953); Glynn v. Roberson, 58 So. 2d
676 (Fla. 1952); Stenor, Inc. v. Lester, 58 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1951); Pappas v. Deringer,
145 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
12. 494 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The supreme court clarified
this point by noting that although the contract in Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d
129 (Fla. 1970), also gave the seller the option of retaining the deposit as liquidated
damages, that case did not deal with that issue. Lefemine, 573 So. 2d at 329.
13. 573 So. 2d at 329.
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the clause. With the option, the clause merely provided a minimum
liability for the breaching buyer, shifting the risk from the seller to the
buyer so that the seller might be able to prove higher actual damages.
Consequently, the court concluded that the deposit forfeiture clause
here was not intended to be a liquidated damages clause and so, appar-
ently for it is unstated, this clause must have been intended as a pen-
alty clause.
The court's conclusion makes sense. A penalty clause is one which
"is designed to deter a party from breaching his contract and to punish
him in the event the deterrent is ineffective.""' Since this clause was
not intended to fix the amount of the damages, what other purpose
might it have had other than to deter the buyers from breaching and to
punish them if they did breach? Because penalty clauses are unenforce-
able in Florida, this seller will have to prove her actual damages.
It is important to note that the court expressly limited its opinion
to the facts of this case. It stated:
"[w]e express no opinion with respect to whether the same result
would occur if the Uniform Commercial Code were applicable to
this transaction, nor do we imply that a liquidated damages clause
which merely provided the option of pursuing equitable remedies
would be unenforceable. 1 5
But there is no readily apparent reason to think the outcome would be
different under the UCC. 1'
14. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 14-31.
15. 573 So. 2d at 330 n.5.
16. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1991) provides:
Liquidation of Limitation of Damages; Deposits.
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the antici-
pated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss,
and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a
penalty.
U.C.C. § 2A-504 (1991) provides:
Liquidation of Damages.
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other act or omis-
sion . . ., may be liquidated in the lease agreement but only at an amount
or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm
caused by the default or other act or omission.
[Vol. 16
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B. Attorney's Fees
The court decided four cases involving attorney's fees. The first
was Stockman v. Downs.17 Justice Grimes wrote the opinion for an
unanimous court which included Chief Justice Shaw and Justices Over-
ton, McDonald, Barkett and Kogan. The court was presented with the
following certified question:
MAY A PREVAILING PARTY RECOVER ATTORNEY'S
FEES AUTHORIZED IN A STATUTE OR CONTRACT BY A
MOTION FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER
ENTRY OF A FINAL JUDGMENT, WHICH MOTION
RAISES THE ISSUE OF THAT PARTY'S ENTITLEMENT
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE FIRST TIME?
The question was answered in the negative.
The prospective buyer of real estate signed a purchase contract
which included a clause providing that the prevailing party in any liti-
gation arising out of the contract would be entitled to recover all costs,
including attorney's fees. When that prospective buyer sued the sellers
for fraud and breach of contract, the complaint included a claim for
attorney's fees based upon that provision. The defendant-sellers raised
affirmative defenses, but did not make a claim for attorney's fees until
after the court had entered the final judgment in their favor based upon
a jury verdict. The court had retained jurisdiction for the taxing of
costs and the award of attorney's fees, but the court ruled that it was
too late for the defendant-sellers to claim attorney's fees.
Florida case law had distinguished between claims for attorney's
fees based upon contract and statute. When the claim was based upon
contract, it had to be specifically pled or it would be waived. However,
it had not seemed necessary to plead a claim for attorney's fees based
upon statute. Two recent supreme court cases had held it proper for a
party to file a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees based upon con-
tract.18 However, those cases were distinguishable because the prevail-
ing parties in both cases had pled their claims for attorney's fees in
their complaints, although they waited to enter their proof until after
17. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
18. Finkelstein v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1986)
(dealing with attorney's fees under FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1983)); Cheek v. McGowan
Elec. Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1987) (dealing with attorney's fees under the
provision of a promissory note).
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final judgment.
The court held that a party to litigation is entitled to notice that
the opponent is going to seek attorney's fees. Important decisions about
the course of the litigation, including decisions to pursue the litigation
or to settle, cannot be made properly without knowing whether the op-
posing party is going to ask for attorney's fees. Therefore, to allow the
matter to be brought up for the first time in a post-judgment motion is
unfair. Consequently, the court ruled that a party must plead a claim
for attorney's fees whether that claim is based upon contract or upon a
statute. 19 While the holding with respect to attorney's fees under a stat-
ute is clearly obiter dictum, it behooves the prudent attorney to plead a
claim for attorney's fees, whatever the source.
It is odd that the court would base its conclusion upon the need to
protect a litigant from unfair surprise. It seems likely that the only
surprise in this case was the one suffered by the successful defendants.
The court mentions no evidence that the plaintiff was caught by sur-
prise. Nor does the court mention any evidence on the record that the
plaintiff would have been prejudiced in any way. In fact, the court
demonstrates that the plaintiff was well aware of the provision because
she made a claim for attorney's fees in her own complaint.
The court did note that there is an exception to the rule. A party
may waive its objection to its opponent's failure to plead a claim for
attorney's fees. Such waiver may be express or it may be implied from
the party's conduct which recognizes or acquiesces to the claim. Two
examples of implied acquiescence were provided. One example was
where the claim for attorney's fees had been raised in the pretrial con-
ference and the plaintiff's pretrial statement listed defendant's attor-
ney's fees claim as an issue. The second example was where the parties
had stipulated during trial that the question of attorney's fees would be
heard subsequent to the final hearing. The record in this case revealed
neither implied nor express acquiescence.
Insurance Company of North America v. Acousti Engineering
Company of Florida20 involved the consolidated review of three con-
19. The court pointed out, however, that this ruling did not address the question
of whether the ruling would apply to attorney's fees sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1988
(1980) due to the United States Supreme Court's decision in White v. Hew Hampshire
Department of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445 (1982). Stockman, 573 So. 2d at
838 n.4.
20. 579 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1991).
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struction arbitrations.2 The Florida Arbitration Code,2" in Florida
Statutes section 682.11, states: "Unless otherwise provided in the
agreement or provision for arbitration, the arbitrator's and umpire's ex-
penses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel
fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as pro-
vided in the award." Apparently there was no contractual provision for
attorney's fees. The prevailing parties sought them under the statute2"
which provides for the award of attorney's fees in successful actions
against insurers.
In a per curiam opinion, the supreme court concluded that section
682.11 does not prohibit a successful party to an arbitration from re-
covering attorney's fees for the attorney's services during the arbitra-
tion if those are provided for by contract or statute. Furthermore, the
attorney's fees recoverable under section 627.428 does include attor-
ney's fees incurred during arbitration. However, section 682.11 does
prohibit the arbitrator from making the award of attorney's fees. That
award must be made by a court. In reaching these conclusions, the
court explicitly adopted the reasoning of the opinion of the Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in Fewox v. McMerit Construction Co.24
The supreme court also issued two opinions dealing with the award
of attorney's fees in the probate of a decedent's estate.2 However,
these were still subject to revision by the court at the time that this
article was written and so their discussion will have to await next year's
survey.
C. Real Estate Purchase Options
Lassiter v. Kaufman.2 Justice Harding wrote the opinion in which
Justices Overton, Barkett and Kogan concurred. Justice Grimes con-
curred in the result and wrote an opinion in which Justice Overton con-
21. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Acousti Eng'g Co., 549 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Fewox v. McMerit Constr. Co., 556 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989); Park Shore Dev. Co. v. Higley S., Inc. 566 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
22. FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1991).
23. FLA. STAT. § 627.428 (1987).
24. 556 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The unanimous en banc opin-
ion was written by Judge Ryder.
25. In re Estate of Warwick, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Apr. 1991); In re Estate
of Platt, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Apr. 1991).
26. 581 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1991).
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curred. Chief Justice Shaw and Justice McDonald dissented without
opinion.
The lessee had exercised his option to purchase the leased prop-
erty, but then the parties disagreed about purchase price and the buyer
sought specific performance. The option had only specified that the
price would be not less than $200,000. The court apparently concluded
that the price was to be the fair market value, although how it came to
this conclusion is left a mystery. But that still left open the question of
whether the fair market value was to be the value of the fee simple
absolute or the fee encumbered by the existing lease. There was expert
testimony that the freehold encumbered by the lease had a market
value of only $275,000, but the value of the unencumbered fee would
be $1,684,000.
The trial court had solved the question by "mechanically" apply-
ing the doctrine of merger.27 Apparently, the logic was that the lease
would be extinguished upon the conveyance to the buyer if merger oc-
curred and so the buyer was acquiring, and should pay for, a fee simple
which was not subject to a lease. The supreme court criticized that
approach by indicating that whether equity would allow merger de-
pended upon what would best serve justice and the intent of the parties.
The supreme court reviewed the two district court precedents2 8 and
went to great efforts to reconcile its conclusion with those cases.
The court indicated that the role of the merger doctrine is only to
help interpret an ambiguous option term. It can be used because it
helps reveal the intent of the parties based upon whether the parties
intended for merger to occur. But this author sincerely doubts whether
these parties, or most parties to options, have any idea, let alone inten-
tions, about the phenomenon of merger. It is hardly likely parties who
were sophisticated enough about real estate law to consider the possi-
bility of merger would have signed an option worded like the one in
Lassiter.
In the end, the supreme court decided it was "unnecessary to de-
termine whether merger should occur or not"2 9 because this option
clause was not ambiguous. The option was for the purchase of the "fee
title" as might be distinguished from a fee subject to an existing lease.
Because the option was for the purchase of the "fee title," the purchase
27. Id. at 148.
28. Palm Pavilion of Clearwater, Inc. v. Thompson, 458 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Contos v. Lipsky, 433 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
29. Lassiter, 581 So. 2d at 149.
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price should be the value of the unencumbered fee simple; i.e.,
$1,684,000.
However, the court went on to state that the result would have
been the same even if the doctrine of merger had been applied. The
court states that "the term 'fee title' expresses an implied intent to
merge.""0 If the court was stating that henceforth it will be implied as
a matter of law from such a term that the parties intended a merger,
then so be it. The court has the power to make such pronouncements,
but the policy which would justify such a pronouncement should be
articulated because it is certainly not apparent. Furthermore, to sug-
gest this term reveals the parties' state of mind regarding merger is
surely a judicial fantasy.
This author agrees with Justice Grimes' concurrence. He stated,
"I do not think the doctrine of merger has much to do with the out-
come of this case"31 because it involved a simple matter of contract
interpretation. He pointed out that the purchase price should be con-
trolled by the intent of the parties and that the words used by the par-
ties should be used to determine that intent. He proceeded to suggest a
general rule which would accomplish the important public purpose of
eliminating the confusion produced by poor drafting: "fIn the absence
of specific language to the contrary in the lease, I would hold that the
option price would always be computed as if the property were unen-
"932cumbered by the lease ....
D. Mortgage Foreclosure
Haven Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kirian.3 3 Justice McDon-
ald wrote the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice Shaw and Jus-
tices Overton, Barkett, Grimes and Kogan concurred.-4
The court held unconstitutional that part of Florida Statute sec-
tion 702.0135 which required the severance of all counterclaims in a
mortgage foreclosure action. In this case, the mortgagor had asserted
both affirmative defenses and counterclaims. These were based upon
allegations that the lender concealed the serious financial troubles of
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 149.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991).
34. Justice Harding did not participate.
35. FLA. STAT. § 702.01 (1987). This section has not been modified by the legis-
lature in the period between its enactment in 1987 and the present.
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the development, and its own financial involvement in the development,
from potential buyers to whom it was providing mortgage financing.
In the circuit court, the lender successfully moved to sever the
counterclaims based upon the mandate in section 702.01 that "the
court shall sever for separate trial all counterclaims . . ." in mortgage
foreclosures. The lender then convinced the trial court to strike the af-
firmative defenses because they were based upon the same grounds as
the stricken counterclaims and, because the court had eliminated all
the defenses, to grant summary judgment in the lender's favor. The
First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding the statute unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it conflicted with the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,36 a conclusion requiring review by the supreme court under arti-
cle V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. The supreme court
affirmed.
Matters of substantive law are within the province of the Florida
legislature, but matters of judicial practice and procedure are within
the exclusive realm of the supreme court. In exercising its power, the
court had adopted the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1.270(b),
in contrast to the statute's mandatory language, allows a judge to sever
counterclaims in order to further convenience or to avoid prejudice.
The court distinguished this case from VanBibber v. Hartford Ac-
cident & Indemnity Insurance Co."7 where it examined the statute
which prohibited the joinder of insurance companies in suits against
their insureds. In VanBibber, the court had found the statute was based
upon a clear legislative intent and policy to create substantive rights.
Consequently, the statute prohibiting joinder was not an unconstitu-
tional attempt by the legislature to regulate procedure. However, the
legislative history behind the mandatory severance provision did not re-
veal a similar clear legislative intent to create substantive rights. 8 The
House Commerce Committee had reported that it was but one of a
number of amendments which were designed "to create a simple, equi-
table, and inexpensive method by which a mortgage lender could en-
force an assignment of rents contract."3 9 Absent the legislative intent
to create a substantive right, the court apparently concluded that this
36. Kirian v. Haven Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 560 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
37. 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983).
38. E.g., the substantive right to foreclose mortgages undelayed by
counterclaims.
39. Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 733 n.l.
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was simply a part of "the machinery of the judicial process .... "'I
As such, the legislature's mandatory rule was unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the supreme court found that the trial court had
erred in striking the affirmative defenses merely because the grounds
for those defenses were the same as the grounds for the counterclaims.
The court pointed out that "counterclaims and affirmative defenses are
separate and distinct terms." '41 So a rule allowing or requiring the sev-
erance of a counterclaim should not be applied to affirmative defenses.
Further, "[a] court cannot grant summary judgment where a defend-
ant asserts legally sufficient affirmative defenses that have not been re-
butted.' ' 2 Of course, it may be argued that this is merely obiter dic-
tum, but it is so completely sensible that it should be followed.
If the trial court had stricken the affirmative defense because it
was based upon inappropriate grounds, that would have been one thing,
but there was no such ruling. Nor could there have been because fraud
and misrepresentation are appropriate affirmative defenses to an action
in equity such as foreclosure. It almost seems that the trial court based
its ruling on a misguided election of remedies theory, i.e., the mortga-
gor was required to choose between using fraud and misrepresentation
as a defense or as a counterclaim, and having used it as a counterclaim,
it was precluded from using it as a defense. Whatever the justification
for the trial court's ruling, it is hoped that this precedent will prevent
similar rulings.
E. " Homestead
City National Bank of Florida v. Tescher.3 Justice Harding
wrote the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice Shaw and Justices
Overton, McDonald, Barkett, Grimes and Kogan concurred.
Article X, section 4(c) of the Florida Constitution provides that
"homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by
spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to the
owner's spouse if there be no minor child." In this case, the decedent
owned homestead property and was survived by a spouse, though not
by a minor child. Read literally, as was argued on behalf of one of
40. Id. at 732 (quoting In re Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66
(Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., concurring)).
41. Id. at 733.
42. Id.
43. 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991).
19911
Nova Law Review
decedent's adult children, the constitution would seem to prohibit
homestead property from being devised to anyone except the spouse,
and the homestead in this case had not been devised to the spouse.
Since the spouse, in this case the husband, had previously renounced
his rights to the decedent's estate, under the laws of intestate succes-
sion, the property would be inherited by the decedent's two adult
children.
The supreme court disagreed. It concluded that the husband's
valid waiver of all rights to homestead in an antenuptial agreement was
the legal equivalent, at least for purposes of this constitutional provi-
sion, of his having died first. Applying this legal fiction, the decedent
was survived by neither spouse nor minor children. Consequently, the
prohibition from devising the property was inapplicable. As the will
had a valid residuary clause, the home could pass by it to the residuary
legatees.
The court looked to the historical purpose of the homestead provi-
sion. It was designed to preserve the family by protecting a) surviving
spouses and b) surviving minor children from the loss of the family's
homestead by restraining the decedent's ability to transfer it. However,
restraints on alienation, particularly alienation by devise, should be
narrowly construed. Decedent's death left no one who was entitled to
the provision's protection. Its interpretation should be narrowed so that
it would not be applied in this inappropriate situation. The court
adopted this legal fiction to simplify the narrowing process.
F. Mechanics' Liens44
Stresscon v. Madiedo." Justice Harding wrote the opinion in
which Chief Justice Shaw and Justices McDonald, Barkett, Grimes
and Kogan concurred. Justice Overton dissented without opinion.
Florida Statute section 713.16(2) provided"' that when a payment
was to be made by the owner to a construction contractor, the owner
could make a written demand for a written statement of the account
made under oath from any person who might claim a mechanics' lien.
44. Technically, mechanics' liens have been replaced by construction liens in
Florida. 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-109, § 1; see FLA. STAT. § 713.001 (Supp. 1990).
45. 581 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1991).
46. FLA. STAT. § 713.16(2) (1987). Section 713.16(2) was unchanged as of the
time this article was written, although Florida Laws chapter 90-109 transformed the
topic into "Construction Lien Law." FLA. STAT. § 713.001 (Supp. 1990).
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Failure to provide the statement, or making a false or fraudulent state-
ment, would cause the loss of the lien. In this case, a sub-contractor
had received a letter demanding a written statement of its account and
had sent a timely and accurate statement, but the statement had not
been under oath. The sub-contractor attempted to cure this oversight
by filing an affidavit that the statement was accurate in the foreclosure
action. The trial court was unimpressed and had granted summary
judgment against the sub-sub-contractor and the Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed, certifying the following question to the supreme
court:
MAY THE FAILURE TO NOTARIZE AN OTHERWISE
TIMELY AND ACCURATE STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT
UNDER SUBSECTION 713.16(2), FLORIDA STATUTES
(1987), BE CURED BY VERIFICATION AFTER THE FACT,
SO LONG AS THERE IS NO PREJUDICE TO THE OPPOS-
ING PARTY?
The supreme court agreed with the district court and answered the
question in the negative.
The court decided this was a simple matter of statutory interpreta-
tion. The court had previously pointed out that mechanics' liens are
purely statutory creatures and, consequently, strict compliance with the
statute's requirements is "a prerequisite for a person seeking affirma-
tive relief under the statute."47 The statute required that a lienor would
lose the lien if it failed to provide a written statement under oath
within thirty days of demand. When that had not occurred, the lien
was lost. This section simply does not allow for cure or for accepting
for substantial compliance, even where that does not prejudice another
party, as do some other sections.
G. Landlord and Tenant
Fitzgerald v. Cestari.4 8 Justice Ehrlich wrote the opinion for an
unanimous court. A seven year-old-child was injured when she ran
through a sliding glass door of the house which her parents were leas-
ing. The door was not made of safety glass and was not marked by
decals so it would be visible when closed. The trial court granted the
47. 581 So. 2d at 160 (quoting with approval Gonas v. Home Elec. of Dade
County, Inc., 537 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
48. 569 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1990).
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landlord's motion for summary judgment which was supported by affi-
davits that the glass was in the door when the lessors purchased the
house, that the glass was not marked as to type, and that the type of
glass was not readily discoverable.
The complaint alleged two separate grounds of liability. The first
was that the lessors "were negligent for failing to ascertain that the
door was not made of safety glass and for failing to conform their
premises to the Southern Standard Building Code which requires
safety glass be used in sliding glass doors."' 9 The supreme court ac-
knowledged that a landlord does have a duty to reasonably inspect resi-
dential premises before the tenant moves in and does have a continuing
duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous conditions of
which it has notice. However, the landlord does not have a duty to have
an expert determine if an unmarked glass door is made of the type of
glass required by the building code. Furthermore, the landlords could
not be held liable for failure to repair a defect of which they did not
have notice.
The court does not discuss the question of whether the landlords
could have been held strictly liable for leasing residential premises in a
defective or dangerous condition.50 Nor does it suggest what might be
the effect of leasing residential premises which are in violation of the
building code. It merely indicated the issue would not be discussed as
the claim was not raised in the trial court that liability should be based
upon the code violation.5'
The second claimed basis for liability was the landlord's failure to
place decals on the sliding glass doors. The supreme court concluded
that the landlords did not have a duty to place decals or the like on the
glass doors visible because they did not constitute "the type of 'danger-
ous condition' which a landlord is in a better position than the tenant to
guard against." If a warning of the presence of the closed sliding glass
door is needed, the tenants in possession of the premises have that
responsibility.
49. Fitzgerald, 569 So. 2d at 1260.
50. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1985).
51. Fitzgerald, 569 So. 2d at 1260 n.2.
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III. INTERESTING OPINIONS FROM OTHER COURTS
A. Seller's Duties to Buyer: Florida Third District Court of
Appeal
Futura Realty v. Lone Star Building Centers, Inc."3 This case in-
volved a per curiam opinion by Judges Nesbitt, Baskin and Jorgenson.
The buyer of real property claimed a) that the seller had commit-
ted fraud by failing to reveal pollution problems and also that b) the
seller and a prior owner were strictly liable for the harm to the site
caused by the use of ultrahazardous chemicals. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the district court affirmed.
The Florida Supreme Court had imposed on the seller the duty to
disclose facts which would materially affect the value of the property
which were not readily observable and were not known to the purchaser
in Johnson v. Davis.53 The supreme court had held that the seller's
duty "is equally applicable to all forms of real property, new and
used."54 However, the third district ignored the plain meaning of that
statement and found that "when read in context, as it must be, [that
statement] clearly applies solely to the sale of homes." 55 The district
court based its conclusion on how it divined the supreme court might
approach a nonresidential case, but without any articulated analysis.
It is possible to distinguish between residential and commercial
transactions on a number of theories: equitable, economic or moral. In
a commercial transaction, the parties might be assumed to be of equal
bargaining power and to operate at arm's length rather than the une-
qual positions of developer and home buyer. But disparity in bargaining
power was not considered a factor by the supreme court in Davis and,
in fact, did not appear to exist in that case which involved individual
sellers rather than a developer.
Nor can economics be seen as supporting the district court's posi-
52. 578 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
53. 4.80 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
54. Id. at 629.
55. Futura Realty, 578 So. 2d at 364. The reference to context might possibly be
to the fact that the supreme court in Johnson v. Davis only discussed the sale of homes,
for that was what the case concerned. Consequently, when articulating the rule, the
supreme court phrased it as "where the seller of a home knows of facts materially
affecting the value of the property .... " 480 So. 2d at 629. However, the district
court opinion did not specify that it was this language upon which it relied in making
its decision.
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tion. It might be argued that the cost of repairing latent defects can
efficiently be passed on to the customers of the buyer's business while a
home buyer has no similar efficient mechanism to spread its similar
costs. However, that would ignore the fact that this ruling will probably
increase the cost of every commercial real estate purchase by requiring
buyers to expend money looking for latent defects about which the
seller already is aware. Certainly it would be more efficient to require
the seller to reveal facts within its knowledge rather than to require
every commercial buyer to engage in an extensive and expensive search
for latent defects. Moreover, it is not an efficient mechanism for
spreading the cost to buyer's business customers. The buyer's search for
latent defects will often fail to disclose existing problems because, being
latent, the problems may not be discovered. The only beneficiaries of
this policy are professional inspectors.
It may be possible to justify the district court's position on the
basis of a philosophy which favors leaving the common law undis-
turbed. The departure from the common law in Davis seems to be
based on moral philosophy rather than economics; i.e., that it is good or
right to protect consumers and that sellers who fail to reveal what they
know about latent defects are behaving wrongfully. But if the point is
to encourage correct behavior, it is irrational to allow conduct by com-
mercial sellers which would be considered blameworthy by residential
sellers. What possible benefit could there be to society from the exis-
tence of a "double standard" in this area? It should also be noted that
consumers are no less able, in general, to hire inspectors to discover
latent defects than are buyers of commercial property.
It may be arguable that it is the nature of commercial property
which makes the commercial sale distinguishable from a residential
sale. Perhaps there is something about commercial property that makes
it more likely that a latent defect will remain undiscovered by the dili-
gent inspection of a prudent buyer. However, there is nothing evident
in this case to suggest anything that might provide the basis for a rea-
soned distinction as a matter of law. This author concludes that the
district court has erred in failing to apply the principle of Davis v.
Johnson to the sale of a commercial property. It has been reported that
the buyers have sought review by the Florida Supreme Court based
upon the claim that the decision in this case conflicts with the decisions
of other districts." It will be interesting to see whether the supreme
56. Gibbs, What's the Duty of Commercial Land Seller?, MIAMI REVIEW, Au-
gust 20, 1991, at 3.
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court agrees with this author when the court considers the issue,
whether in this or some other case.
On the second issue, the district court seems to have fared better.
Under the common law of Florida, a landowner has a duty not to per-
mit ultrahazardous activity57 which causes harm to a neighbor's land. 8
In this case, the plaintiff sought to have the scope of the landowner's
duty expanded to protect subsequent owners of the same land. The
court reasoned that a subsequent owner can protect itself from the
harm by carefully inspecting the property before acquiring it and by
providing for the possibility of such harm, or risk of it, in the negotia-
tions over the price. That distinguishes the subsequent owner from the
otherwise defenseless neighbor whom the strict liability rule evolved to
protect. Of course, the court's reasoning on this issue would make more
sense if the seller were required, based upon Davis v. Johnson to reveal
the existence of latent defects, particularly hazardous defects, such as
existed in this case.
B. Arbitration: Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal
Laniewicz v. Rutenberg Construction Co."0 Judge Sharp wrote the
opinion in which Judges Cobb and Gorshon concurred.
The buyers of a new house sued the seller/builder for damages
arising from construction defects in the home. The sales contract in-
cluded a provision that: "[a]ll claims or disputes between the Buyer
and Seller arising out of this agreement shall be decided by arbitra-
tion ... "60 Accordingly, the matter was referred to arbitration.
The arbitrator decided that there were construction defects which
were the fault of the builder. But because the defects had not been
fixed over the two year period and because the defects could most eco-
nomically be fixed if the builder took the house back, the arbitrator
decided that the sale should be rescinded. The buyers objected. That
was not the relief which they had sought, but the circuit court con-
firmed the: arbitration award.
The District Court of Appeal reversed on two grounds. First, re-
57. The process by which the environmental hazards accumulated at the site are
described in Seaboard Systems Railroad v. Clemente, 467 So. 2d 348, 353 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
58. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co.
v. Sea Gull Operating Corp., 460 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
59. 580 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
60. Id. at 204 n.1.
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scission is an equitable remedy and, as such, it is available only where
the remedy at law; i.e., monetary damages, would be inadequate. Of
course, the claimant had not bothered to enter evidence on that point
because it was not an element of the relief sought. Second, rescission is
a remedy which a party may elect. But here, neither party had elected
rescission. Consequently, the arbitrator had no basis for awarding it.
Consequently, the circuit court should not have confirmed the award.
Thus far, the discussion reveals nothing remarkable about this
case. However, the court goes on to comment that, "we are essentially
reviewing an arbitrator's award which finds that the arbitration con-
tract should be rescinded."61 That introduced an interesting question.
Can an arbitrator make such an award? It may be argued that an arbi-
trator ordering rescission of the contract containing the arbitration
clause would eliminate the contractual authority of the arbitrator, elim-
inating the effect of the arbitration award. Completing the circle, that
would eliminate the rescission award, leaving the contract in effect. The
court posited, in dictum, that "[w]e are hesitant to say that under no
circumstances could an arbitrator determine that a contract should be
rescinded .... ."" but it is unclear that this is even the point which
the court is addressing and the court did not provide any more on the
point.
There is little doubt that under the Federal Arbitration Act 3 re-
scission based upon fraud in the inducement is a question which can be
decided by arbitrators based upon the logic that the arbitration clause
is a separate contract.6 4 Florida courts have followed similar logic,
drawing the distinction between the arbitrable claim that the overall
contract was subject to rescission 65 and the claim that the arbitration
clause was the product of fraudulent inducement which must be de-
61. Id. at 204.
62. Id.
63. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
64. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see
also Lawrence v. Comprehensive Business Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1987);
Merit Stainless Steel, Inc. v. Nippon Stainless Steel Co., 818 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1987);
Union Mutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 524 (1st
Cir. 1985); Manning v. Interfuture Trading, Inc., 578 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991).
65. Shearson/Lehman Bros. v. Ordonez, 497 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 412 So. 2d 871, 874 n.3
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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cided by the court. 66
Of course, since the obligation to arbitrate is contractual, the
scope of the arbitration can be limited by the contract. In this case,
there was no hint that the parties intended to limit the type of relief
which the arbitrator could award. But the problem here was that the
way the clause was drafted left it open, at least arguably, to different
interpretations. If the parties really intended that "[a]ll claims or dis-
putes arising out of this agreement" were to be decided by arbitration,
then logically they must have intended that the arbitration clause sur-
vive the extinguishment of the contract by its merger into the deed at
the closing. Similarly, they also must have intended that the arbitration
clause survive any rescission of the contract of sale because the parties
intended that the arbitration clause be an independent agreement.
Such matters should be considered when an attorney is drafting an
arbitration clause. The attorney should be careful to indicate clearly
that the arbitration clause is intended to (or not to) include the possi-
bility of an arbitration award of rescission and that it is intended to (or
not to) survive the closing of a real estate sale. Of course, similar con-
sideration in drafting of all the other clauses, e.g., attorney's fees
clauses, is also appropriate.
C. RICO: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit
United States v. One Single Family Residence.67 Circuit Judge
Hatchett wrote the opinion for the panel, which also included Judges
Clark and Dubina, affirming the decision of District Judge Lenore Car-
rero Nesbitt.
Two brothers purchased a vacant lot with plans to build a house
there and sell it for a profit. When the federal government filed a for-
feiture complaint" alleging that the lot had been bought and improved
with drug proceeds, brother Gary claimed that he was an innocent
owner and his investment was comprised of funds from legitimate
sources. The government showed that brother Curtis had "very few re-
ported legitimate sources of income or employment, a bad credit rating,
66. Spitz v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 502 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
67. 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1991).
68. The complaint was filed under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1990).
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and a reputation as a drug smuggler." 69 Consequently, the government
contended, Gary's knowledge of the illegal source of his brother's share
deprived Gary of his innocent owner status under the statute, leaving
him defenseless in the forfeiture action.
The Court of Appeals framed the issue as follows: "[Wihether a
property owner who is aware that a co-owner has purchased and im-
proved the real property with drug proceeds may qualify as an innocent
owner whose interest in the property is exempt from forfeiture under
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)?" And the Court of Appeals answered the ques-
tion in the negative. It was uncontested that there was a substantial
connection between the property and Curtis' involvement with the drug
trade. The burden of proof was on Gary to prove a) that he lacked
actual knowledge that his co-owner's investment was made with tainted
funds and b) that his own investment was made with money from en-
tirely legitimate sources in order to qualify as an "innocent owner."
Gary did not carry his burden and, consequently, lost his land.
The court rejected the rationale of United States v. Premises
Known as 2639 Meeting House Road"0 which concluded that Congress
had not intended to deprive legitimate investors of their property. The
court decided to classify people as falling into one of only two possible
categories, innocent or wrongdoer. "If one is an innocent owner, no
amount of that person's or entity's funds are forfeitable . . . .On the
other hand, if one is a wrongdoer, the full value of the real property is
forfeitable because some of the funds invested are traceable as the stat-
ute dictates .. ..*",' Thus it appears that a form of the doctrine of
caveat emptor, which is becoming so outmoded in other areas of law, is
alive and well in RICO law.
The court did, however, recognize that RICO has some limits.
Forfeiture is unavailable against a co-owner who learns about the ille-
gal sources of his co-owner after having made the investment," but
only if he makes every reasonable effort possible to withdraw from the
co-ownership after learning of the problem. Moreover, the burden of
69. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d at 978.
70. 633 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
71. One Single Family Residence, 933 F.2d at 981-82.
72. Id. at 982 n.5.
73. This is the "Calero-Toledo dicta." United States v. One Single Family Resi-
dence, 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988), interpreted language in Calero-Toledo v.
Peterson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974), to require an "innocent owner"
claimant to have done everything reasonably possible to prevent illegal use of his
property.
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proof is on the co-owner who is claiming to be innocent of any knowl-
edge of the connection to the tainted money. Failure to carry that bur-
den will mean the loss of the property. The moral of this case, for those
who had not heard it before, is to be very careful with whom you get
involved. Big Brother is watching you, and it is just possible that Big
Brother is going to seize your land.
IV. CONCLUSION
These cases illustrate that real estate law is neither for the faint-
of-heart nor the ill-informed. Real estate lawyers cannot rely upon the
law remaining static, but the basic skills of drafting, of contract inter-
pretation and of statutory interpretation are still at the crux of the
most important disputes. The critical time for the modern real estate
lawyer to exercise those skills is before any document is drafted,
whether that document be a real estate purchase option, a real estate
purchase contract, a will, an affidavit or a complaint.
1991]

